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NOTES
Feagin: Statutory Recognition
of the Close Corporation in Florida

[T]he policy of non-liability... is insupportable in law,
logic, and elementary justice-and I shall continue to dissent
from it until the cows come home.
HmB BLESSING

STATUTORY RECOGNITION OF THE CLOSE
CORPORATION IN FLORIDA
During the past decade legal writers have given the close corporation wide recognition as a separate and distinct business organization.'
Legislative recognition of the close corporation, however, has been accorded with considerably more restraint. A noted authority recently
2
observed:
[No] jurisdiction in this country has enacted a comprehensive
statute setting up separate rules and regulations for close corporations. As a matter of fact, the term "close corporation" is not
used at all in corporation statutes.
The 1963 Florida Legislature has the distinction of rendering this statement obsolete, at least in part, by its enactment of part II, chapter 608
of the Florida Statutes3 the provisions of which "extend to all close corporations." 4 The objective of this note is to examine the provisions of
this radically new law in light of the needs of the close corporation, the
existing Florida Business Corporation Act and similar provisions of the
laws of other states.
1. ONEAL, CLOSE COBPOATIONS (1958); Latty, The Close Corporationand
the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34 N.C.L. REv. 432 (1956);
O'Neal, Recent Legislation Affecting Close Corporations, 23 LAw & CoNsp.
PnoB. 341 (1958); Powers, Cross Fire on the Close Corporation: Norms versus
Needs, 11 U. FLA. L. REv. 433 (1958); Stevens, Close Corporationsand the New
York Business CorporationLaw of 1961, 11 BuFrA.o L. REV. 481 (1962); Note, A
Plea for SeparateStatutory Treatment for the Close Corporation,33 N.Y.U.L. REv.
700 (1958).
2. O'Neal, Recent Legislation Affecting Close Corporations, 23 LAw & CONTEmP. PaO. 341 (1958).
3. The complete text of the new act may be found in the APPENDIX.
4. FLA. STAT. §608.0100(1) (1963).
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For the purposes of introduction, and admittedly an oversimplification, it is sufficient to describe the close corporation as one whose
shares are not generally traded in the securities markets but are closely
held, usually by a small number of persons most of whom are actively
engaged in the operation of the corporate enterprise. 5 Stockholders of
the typical close corporation need and desire a business form that will
provide: (1) flexibility in the distribution of control so that minority
interests can be granted an effective voice in management; (2) an opportunity to conduct their affairs with the informality suitable to an
intimate association of owner-managers; and (8) an authorization to
settle paralyzing disputes likely to grow out of divided power and intimate association; when reconciliation of differences is impossible
stockholders should be able to withdraw from the enterprise without
undue injury. The majority of business corporation laws were designed for the large public-issue corporations and do not satisfy the
special needs of the close corporation. 6 Thus, were it not for the corporations lure of limited liability for all participants, more businessmen
undoubtedly would choose to organize as a partnership 7 rather than
submit to incompatible laws under which they have endured a long
history of mistreatment. 8
With the passage of the new act Florida moves to the forefront of
those jurisdictions that, in recognition of the importance of close corporations to general business development, 9 have acted affirmatively to
deal with the special problems of these corporations. Florida's act removes illogical restrictions, legitimizes heretofore doubtful practices,
emphasizes freedom of contract, and abandons the attitude that any
regulation is justified as the price for the state's grant of corporate existence and the benefits of limited liability."0 A close reading of the
act, however, reveals that in some instances the legislature's intentions
have surpassed its draftsmanship. Although the general purpose of
most provisions is clear, a lack of preciseness at critical points creates
disturbing uncertainties. Moreover, the failure to integrate the special
law with the provisions of Florida's general corporation law, 11 which
5. See, e.g., 1 O'N_

L, CLosE. CorportATioNs, §1.02, at 2 (1958).
6. Id. §1.13, at 27.
7. See, e.g., BAxE & C ny, CoEFpoAONS, 239-40 (8d ed. 1959).
8. See Powers, supra note 1.
9. Comprising the great majority of all corporations, the close corporation
business form represents an important phase in the growth and development of
many American businesses. Id. at 470, 473.
10. A stimulus for the legislature's action may have been provided by Professor Powers' article clearly presenting the plight of the Florida close corporation in
light of the inadequacies of the then existing Business Corporation Act. Powers,
supra note 1.
11. FLA. STAT. ch. 608, pt. I (1963).
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undoubtedly continues to control close corporations to the extent that
it is not superseded or modified by the special law,' 2 has produced
several serious inconsistencies. The judiciary and bar of Florida must
deal with these inconsistencies and uncertainties as they attempt to
give effect to the real and substantial benefits that the new act offers
to the close corporation.
A SEP

TE STATUTE

Florida's new law, codified as a separate part of chapter 608 and
expressly limited to close corporations, is, both in form and effect, a
separate statute. The practicability of creating a separate law for close
corporations has been the subject of controversy among a number of
recognized authorities.' 3 Disagreement centers principally on the
problem of defining the close corporation so that the provisions of the
separate law will be suitable to all corporations encompassed by the
definition. The definition found in the Florida statute is based on the
characteristic that is common to the greatest number of corporations
normally considered as close. The statute provides: "As used herein,
'close corporation" means a corporation for profit whose shares of stock
are not generally traded in the markets maintained by securities dealers or brokers."'4 This definition has received the express approval of
several legal writers,' 5 and is used in single provisions of the general
business corporation laws of New York' 6 and North Carolina' 7 to limit
the application of those provisions to close corporations. A difficulty
12. The Close Corporations Act, FLA. STAT. ch. 608, pt. H (1963), deals only
with a limited area of close corporation problems. It does not provide many of the
basic requirements of a complete business corporation law, such as the mechanics
of incorporation, which the general business corporation law, FLA. STAT. ch. 608,
pt. I (1963), must continue to provide for the close corporation.
13. See Kessler, The Statutory Requirement for a Board of Directors: A Corporate Anachronism, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 696, 720-21 (1960); O'Neal, Recent Legislation Affecting Close Corporations,23 LAw & CoNmNi. PROB. 341, 342, 362
(1958); Stevens, Close Corporations and the New York Business Corporation Law
of 1961, 11 BurALo L. REv. 481, 483 (1962).
14. FLA. STAT. §608.0100(2) (1963). (Emphasis added.)
15. See 1 O'NxFL, CLOSE COOa-oNs §1.02, at 5 (1958); Latty, The Close
Corporationand the North CarolinaBusiness CorporationAct, 84 N.C.L. BEV. 432,
439 (1956); Powers, Cross Fire on the Close Corporation: Norms versus Needs,
11 U. FLA. L. Ev. 433, 450 (1958); Note, A Plea for Separate Statutory Treatment for the Close Corporation,33 N.Y.U.L. BPv. 700, 705 (1958).
16. N.Y. Bus. CoRnP. Lx-w §620(c). The overall policy of the New York Business Corporation Law is to provide a single statute applicable to all corporations
and not to afford separate statutory treatment to the close corporation. Henn, The
Philosophies of the New York Business Corporation Law of 1961, 11 BUF'FA.O L.
REv,. 439, 442 (1962).

17. N.C. Csu. STAT. §55-73(b) (1960).
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arises in that all of the provisions of Florida's close corporation law are
made applicable to the definition's wide range of corporations, which
may differ markedly when compared according to criteria that other
authorities assert should control. Foremost among other suggested criteria are substantial identity of ownership and management 8 and a
small number of intimate stockholders.' 9 Although each of the distinguishing characteristics represents a compelling reason for exemption
of the qualifying corporations from some particular corporate norm or
norms, it is illogical to base exemption from all of these norms on a corporation's possession of a single characteristic, even if it be agreed that
it is the most essential characteristic. Consider, for example, the absurdity of permitting a corporation with 500 stockholders to substitute
management by the stockholders for management by a representative
21
board of directors20 or to take stockholder action without a meeting,
solely because the stock of the corporation is subject to transfer restrictions and is therefore not generally traded in the securities markets.
This result is possible under the new Florida law. As a solution to this
problem one writer suggests that "the statute's application can be limited ... by a series of definitions designed to include within the scope
of each provision only those corporations whose use of that definition is
justified."22 If this approach were adopted, Florida's definition could
be used to determine a corporation's general qualification under the
provisions of the statute, but to obtain the benefits of a specific provi23
sion, a close corporation would be required to meet additional tests.
This solution, however, presents the draftsman with the task of creating
several workable definitions, each tailored to the special requirements
of a particular provision. The task may well be insurmountable. 24

In answer to criticism of a separate statute, authorities have suggested possible advantages that may attach to such special treatment
18. See, e.g., Kessler, The New York Business CorporationLaw, 36 ST. JoHN's
L.E Ev. ,6 (1961).
19. See Winer, Proposing a New York "Close CorporationLaw," 28 CommLL
L.Q. 313, 315 (1948).
20. See FLA.STAT. §608.0102 (1963).
21. See FLA.STAT. §608.0104 (1963).

22. Note, 71 Hnv. L. REv. 1498, 1506 (1958).
23. For instance, in determining eligibility for stockholder management in
place of board management, the most important criterion would seem to be substantial identity between ownership and management.
24. As the definition is more narrowly drawn it necessarily becomes more arbitrary, and thus objectionable for that reason. See Latty, The Close Corporation
and the North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 84 N.C.L. REv. 432, 447
(1956); O'Neal, Recent Legislation Affecting Close Corporations,23 LAw & CONT'm . PamE. 341, 42 (1958).
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of the close corporation. 25 Some of these advantages are: (1) dispelling uncertainties about control devices presently in use; 26 (2) ac27
quainting persons with the special nature of the close corporation;
(3) invoking more sympathetic treatment from the courts; 28 (4)
achieving special tax treatment;2 9 and (5) clearly establishing that
provisions relating to the unusual needs of close corporations are unavailable to public issue corporations.30 Possible disadvantages, in addition to the problem of applying whatever definition or definitions are
adopted, include confining the development of the close corporation
within the boundaries of the separate law and thereby inhibiting normal growth, 3 1 and increasing the risk that the provisions of the new
law will not be successfully integrated with provisions of the general
Business Corporation Act that might continue to apply.32 The question of the advantages and disadvantages of a separate statute is presently mere speculation. Florida is the first state to enact such a law,
and it is her experience that will provide more definite answers.
THE APPLicATiON OF 'rom CLOSE CoBxoTnIoN Acr
Assuming that a corporation meets Florida's definition of a close
corporation, access to the statutes provisions is not automatically assured. Section 608.0100(1) purports to control application of the statute, but its vague language leaves several questions unanswered. The
section distinguishes between close corporations coming into existence
before and after September 1, 1963, and provides that corporations in
the former category must elect by written consent to come within the
provisions of the act. By implication, the act automatically applies to
corporations in the latter category. This section further provides that
25. O'Neal, Foreword to Note, A Plea for Separate Statutory Treatment for
the Close Corporation,33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 700, 703 (1958).
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Note, A Plea for Separate Statutory Treatment for the Close Corporation,
33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 700, 706 (1958).
29. O'Neal, supra note 25, at 703. Special federal income tax treatment has
been accorded a particular type of close corporation by Subehapter S, INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954 §§1371-77. See BrrrKER, FEDER.AL INCoME TAxATION or ConponATIONS AND S
xmumnoLDErs §§13.01-.07 (1959).
30. Note, 33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 700, 706 (1958). But see Powers, Cross Fire on
the Close Corporation: Norms versus Needs, 11 U. FLA. L. REv. 433, 452-53
(1958).
31. O'Neal, Recent Legislation Affecting Close Corporations,23 LAW & CONTEAM PaoB. 341, 362 (1958).
32. This problem, which is apparent in the Florida Close Corporation Act,
might have been avoided if the Florida Legislature had amended the general
business corporation law rather than enacting what is in effect a separate law.
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in all cases the statute "shall be deemed permissive and not mandatory . . .

."

Considering the effect of section 608.0100(1) in the light

of provisions in other sections, the stockholders of a close corporation
formed after September 1, 1963 appear to have almost unlimited
power to avail themselves of rights under 'the act. This conclusion is
based upon several considerations. (1) There is no requirement that a
corporation formed after September 1, 1963 take affirmative action in
order to invoke the statte's general grant of powers, such powers being
automatically available upon formation. (2) The act is directed toward increasing the rights and powers of stockholders, not the corpo33
ration. (3) With the exception of adopting stockholder management,
the stockholders may implement substantial changes authorized by the
statute through side agreements34 and thus avoid formal corporation
action. (4) The validity of a provision in the certificate of incorporation limiting stockholder rights under the new act is uncertain. Although such a provision is authorized by the general Business Corporation Act,3 5 the legislature has provided in only one single sections" of
the new act that rights under that section may be limited by the certificate or bylaws. Unless this language is to be regarded as mere surplusage, it can be construed as implying a legislative intent that other
sections, from which the express authorization was omitted, cannot be
so limited.37 Notwithstanding this construction, stockholders should be
permitted to waive rights intended solely for their benefit. This is not
to say that majority stockholders, by adopting a certificate amendment,
can waive the rights of a minority. To the contrary, the provisions of
this act afford nonassenting stockholders a reasonable basis for asserting that such certificate provisions are invalid as a limitation on their
rights.3 8 It is doubtful, however, that the legislature intended the provisions of the act to apply unless all stockholders agreed to waive. If
33. FLA. STAT. §608.0102 (1963). The provisions adopting stockholder management must be contained in the "Articles of Incorporation." See text at note 61
infra for discussion of the suggested inappropriateness of "Articles of Incorporation" in this context.
84. FLA.STAT. §608.0105 (1963).
35. The articles of incorporation shall contain: "any provision creating, dividing, limiting and regulating the powers of the ... stockholders... ." FL& STAT.
§608.03(2)(j) (1963).
86. "[A] contrary provision by agreement or in the bylaws or articles of incorporation.... will prevent the stockholders from removing directors without
cause. FLA. STAT. §608.0106 (1963).
37. Cf., Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So. 2d 341, 342 (Fla. 1952).
38. For examples of rights that a minority may exercise without prior authorization in the certificate of incorporation or bylaws see FLA. STAT. §608.0105(1)
(1963) (right to enter into voting agreements); FLA. STAT. §608.0105(3) (1963)
(right to enter into agreements with directors restricting their discretion); FLA.
STAT. §608.0107 (1963) (right to petition for dissolution on deadlock).
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the legislature intended instead that lawfully adopted provisions of the
certificate of incorporation should control the application of the new
act, it should eliminate the surplus language in section 608.0106 and
include within the act a clause clearly expressing that intention.
The chief danger in according stockholders such freedom in exercising rights under the statute is the possibility of a prejudicial effect
upon the rights of creditors and investors. Although such parties are
afforded constructive notice that the statute is applicable to a corporation with which they are dealing,3 9 it is difficult for them to ascertain
whether the statutes provisions have been utilized to effect a hidden
change in the apparent structure of control. Control arrangements
may be contained wholly in side agreements 40 with no requirement
that their existence be noted in the certificate of incorporation, bylaws,
minutes, or on share certificates. 41 Since corporate officers are not necessarily informed of all existing side agreements, inquiry among all
stockholders would be necessary. Depending upon the number and
location of stockholders, individual inquiry could be an arduous and
virtually impossible task. Although creditors and investors who are
damaged by undisclosed side agreements may bring an action to challenge the validity of such agreements, 42 this remedy is a poor substitute for prior disclosure of information vitally affecting the risk of the
transaction.
In the case of a close corporation existing prior to September 1,
1963, the statute's applicability and -the exercise of rights thereunder
becomes more uncertain. In order for the statute to apply to such corporations, the owners of a majority of the voting stock "must elect to
bring themselves within the provisions of this act by written consent.
. . "43 Unfortunately there is no requirement that the written consent
be filed with the secretary of state44 and, consequently, no assurance
89. See FLA. STAT. §§608.04, .06 (1963). The date the articles of incorporation are approved by the secretary of state, determining the beginning of corpo-

rate existence, is noted on the original of such articles on file with the secretary of
state. This information is available as a matter of public record.

40.

FLA. STAT.

§608.0105 (1968).

41. Compare FLA. STAT. §608.43(2) (1968) (notation of voting trust agreement on share certificate subject thereto); FLA. STAT. §614.17 (1963) (notation of
transfer restriction on share certificates subject thereto). For provisions that better
protect creditors and investors see N.Y. Bus. Corn,. LAw §620(g) (notation of
director restricting agreements on all share certificates).
42. The act validates agreements that restrict the discretion of directors or
establish partner-like control only as between the parties thereto. By implication
third parties may challenge such agreements. FLA. STAT. §§608.0105(2), (3)

(1963).
43. FLA. STAT. §608.0100(1) (1963).
44. Compare FLA. STAT. §621.04 (1968) (requirement that a previously existing corporation amend certificate of incorporation to come within provisions of
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that creditors and investors will be put on inquiry notice of controlling
side agreements. It is more disturbing that the election may be made
"by written consent' rather than in a duly called stockholders' meeting.
Thus, minority stockholders may have no notice and no opportunity to
be heard regarding a decision that could drastically alter those control
arrangements upon which they had originally relied in entering into
the corporate endeavor. Even if the election were made at a stockholders' meeting, the minority stockholder could not exercise veto powers held under a high vote requirement, 4 5 for 'the act expressly states
that the election can be made by a "majority of the voting stock." 46 If
the majority stockholders are permitted to retain exclusive control of
the written consent, which must be produced to support an exercise of
rights under the act, the minority stockholders are effectively denied
access to the act's provisions. This result would be unavoidable if
withdrawal of the consent by the majority is judicially construed to
remove the corporation from the application of the statute. Other
troublesome questions involve the ability of the majority to restrict
their consent to particular provisions and the effect of the act upon
conflicting provisions in the corporation's previously existing certificate
and bylaws.
Similar questions engendered by the vague provision of section
608.0100(1) could be posed at length, but hopefully the point has been
made. An amendment is in order. At the very least such an amendment should require stockholders of a previously existing corporation
who desire to bring the corporation within the Close Corporation Act
to make this election according to the procedure required for amendment of the certificate of incorporation. 47 Thus, the election, notice of
which would be filed with the secretary of state, could be made only at
a duly called stockholders' meeting by such proportion of the voting
stock, not less than a majority, as may be provided in the certificate.
Perhaps every close corporation, regardless of when it was formed,
should be allowed to invoke the application of the act only by provision in the certificate of incorporation. Such a requirement would insure that third parties had notice of the act's application and would
afford all stockholders an opportunity to consider consequences under
the act before it became effective as to them. More direct protection
would be afforded to minority stockholders and third parties by a reProfessional Service Corporation Act).
45. Although Florida's general business corporation law does not authorize
high vote requirements for all stockholder action, in the case of amendments to the
certificate of incorporation a high vote requirement may be utilized. FLA. STAT.
§608.18(1) (1963).
46. FLA.STAT. §608.0100(1) (1963).
47. FLA.STAT. §608.18(1), (8) (1963).
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quirement that extraordinary control agreements authorized by the act
receive unanimous stockholder approval and be filed as part of the
corporate records.
CoNnt&cr
The dominant theme of Florida's new act is stockholder control of
the corporate endeavor exercised pursuant to the stockholders' written
agreements and restricted only to the extent necessary to protect real
and legitimate interests of the state.48 In making effective this right of
stockholder self-determination, the legislature necessarily evidenced a
high regard for freedom of contract. An additional purpose of freeing
the close corporation from unnecessary restraint is to eliminate the
oppression of minority interests resulting from uncontrolled majority
rule.49 Although freedom of contract allows the prospective minority
stockholder to bargain for a share of control with assurance that agreements will be enforced, this same freedom of contract can jeopardize
the position of the minority stockholder in an existing corporation by
affording an unorganized majority the means to solidify control.5 0 This
double-edged effect of freedom of contract will be intensified if the
majority's agreements conclusively determining policy are enforced
against a dissenting minority. 51
STocKHoLm

CONTROL AND FREDOM OF

Stockholder Management
In allowing stockholders relatively unrestrained control of the close
corporation, the new act permits stockholders to decide whether management shall be by the traditional board of directors or by the stockholders themselves. Section 608.0102 provides:
The articles of incorporation of a close corporation may provide
that the business of the corporation shall be managed by the
stockholders of the corporation rather than by a board of directors, provided that there be not less than three stockholders ....

The above provision represents an unprecedentedC5 2 departure from
the universally recognized corporate norm, reflected in section 608.
48. The state has a legitimate concern primarily in the protection of creditors,
potential investors, and the stockholders themselves. See Kessler, The Statutory
Requirement of a Board of Directors: A Corporate Anachronism, 27 U. Cm. L.
REv. 696, 722 (1960).
49. For a comprehensive treatment of this subject see O'NsAL & DanWIN,
EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF Busnmss AssocrTEs, §§8.01-.11 (1961).
50. But see Kessler, supra note 48, at 729-80 advocating this result.
51. See text accompanying notes 90-93 infra.
52. No other state expressly authorizes the complete elimination of director
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09(1), Florida Statutes: "The business of every corporation shall be
managed and its corporate powers exercised by a board of not less
than three directors... ." Authorities have long maintained that this
requirement is a "superfluous complication" when the stockholders are
few in number and are actively engaged in the management of the corporation. 5s In such circumstances each stockholder is his own representative at the management level, thus removing a principal need for
a board of directors.5 4 When the stockholders elect to manage the corporation directly, they rid themselves of the unnecessary formality of
board action; but they lose, to a certain extent, their limited liability.
Subsection (2) of section 608.0102 provides that the "stockholders . . .
shall be subject to the liabilities imposed by part I chapter 608 for action taken by directors." Although chapter 608 expressly establishes
director liability for breach of certain duties, 55 it does not describe the
general fiduciary duty of directors that is recognized by Florida case
law.5 6 Certainly a fiduciary duty and liability for its breach should be
57
placed upon the managing stockholders.
The value of Florida's advance in the area of stockholder management is diminished somewhat by illogical limitations and disappointing
omissions in the language of section 608.0102. The primary defect is
the provision that the section shall not apply where there are less than
three stockholders. Courts and practitioners will be hard pressed to
justify the legislature's unexplained determination that a close corporation with twenty, or even 200, stockholders can function effectively
without a board of three directors, although a one-man corporation
management and the substitution of stockholder management. See MoDEL. Bus.
But see PUnRTo Rico LAws ANN. tit.
14, §1102(c) (1962) authorizing stockholder management when there are not
more than 11 stockholders.
53. 1 O'NEA,
CLosE ConPoATIoNs §3.60 (1958); Kessler, The Statutory
Requirement of a Board of Directors: A Corporate Anachronism, 27 U. Cm. L.
REv. 696 (1960); Winer, Proposing a New York "Close Corporation Law," 28
ConN=_r L.Q. 313 passim (1943).
54. Note, 33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 700, 712 (1958).
55. FLA. STAT. §608.53 (1963) (payment of dividend when the corporation
is insolvent); FLA. STAT. §608.54 (1963) (unlawful withdrawals, divisions, and
decreases of capital); FLA. STAT. §608.55 (1963) (prohibited transfers to officers
or stockholders; preferential transfers to creditors after or in contemplation of insolvency); FLA. STAT. §608.56 (1963) (commencing business before minimum
capital is paid in); FLA. STAT. §608.58 (1963) (false reports and statement made
with intent to defraud).
56. Flight Equip. & Eng'r Corp. v. Shelton, 103 So. 2d 615, 626 (Fla. 1958).
57. Cf., Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (recognizing
fiduciary duty between stockholders of a close corporation); Stone v. Holly Hill
Fruit Products, 56 F.2d 553, 554 (5th Cir. 1932) (right of minority to have the
majority exercise their judgment honestly and not fraudently).
CoRP. AcT ANN. §§33, 84 (Supp. 1962).
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cannot.5 8 Jurisdictions that have hesitated to eliminate entirely the re-

quirement for a board of directors have nevertheless permitted the
number of directors to be reduced to less than three where there were
less than three stockholders. 59 Certainly no protection is afforded creditors by requiring the one or two-man corporation to have three directors, two of which may well be judgment-proof dummies. 60 The restriction on the application of section 608.0102 should be removed,
unless the section can be amended to reveal a now hidden but valid
interest of the state.
Section 608.0102 requires that a provision for stockholder management be contained in the "articles of incorporation." If "articles" is
intended to mean "certificate,"6 1 failure to provide that all, or at least a
high percentage, of the stockholders must approve such a provision
may jeopardize minority interests. For example, non-resident minority stockholders whose interests are represented by a director, 62 but

63
who do not have power as stockholders to veto amendments, could
be deprived of effective representation by a vote of the majority to
establish stockholder management. Even absent these special circumstances, the fundamental nature of the change from director to stockholder management would seem to warrant a requirement for unanimous stockholder approval. 64 An amendment to this effect would not

58. The validity of the one-man corporation had been recognized in Florida
case law, Advertects, Inc. v. Sawyer Indus., 84 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1955), prior to
express legislative approval in the new act. FA. STAT. §608.0101 (1963).
59. DEL. CODE ANN.tit. 8, §141(b) (Supp. 1962); N.Y. Bus. Corn'. ACT.
§702; Wyo. STAT. §17-36.84 (Supp. 1963).
60. Dividend restrictions, rules against capital impairment and watered stock
liability are the real protectors of creditors' interests. See Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North CarolinaBusiness CorporationAct, 34 N.C.L. REv. 432,
435 (1956).
61. " 'Articles of incorporation' means the agreement between the subscribers
regarding the details of organization of the proposed corporation before approval
thereof. . . ' FLA. STAT. §608.02 (1963) (Emphasis added.); "'Certificate of
incorporation' means the articles of incorporation after the subscribers thereof have
complied with every prerequisite and corporate existence has begun. . . ." FLA.
STAT. §608.02 (1963).
The statutory definition of a word must be ascribed to
that word wherever used in the statute unless a contrary intent clearly appears.
Richard Bertram & Co. v. Green, 132 So. 2d 24, 26 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1961). Since
the articles of incorporation are merely a phase in the creation of the certificate of
incorporation, stockholder management can be provided for only at the time of
incorporation and not by a later amendment of the certificate.
62. Cumulative voting, which permits a minority stockholder to elect a director(s), is specifically authorized in Florida. FLA.STAT. §608.03(2) (j)(1963).
63. Minority interests can be protected by a high vote requirement for amendment of the certificate of incorporation under the general business corporation law.
FLA.STAT. §608.18(1) (1963).
64. Cf., N.Y. Bus. Corn'. LAw §620(b)(1) (unanimous approval required if
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only protect minority interests, but would also operate to limit the application of the provision to those relatively small close corporations
for which stockholder management is best suited.
The act should clearly establish the procedure by which stockholders operating without a board of directors may exercise the power of
management. Section 608.0102(3) directs that the stockholders may
take action at a meeting of the stockholders or by unanimous written
consent. Section 608.0102(1) provides, however, that stockholders
shall be considered as directors in applying the provisions of the general Business Corporation Act. There is a conflict in several instances
between the procedures applicable to a meeting of stockholders suggested in section 608.0102(3) and procedures required for director
action suggested in section 608.0102(1). The most important question
to be resolved concerns the voting rights of stockholders acting as directors. Will such stockholders vote per capita as provided for directors,6 or will they continue to vote according to their ownership interests as prescribed by the general Business Corporation Act for action at
a stockholders' meeting?1 6 Per capita voting rights would vest control
in minority stockholders in every corporation where a single individual
owned the majority stock, since there would always be at least two
minority stockholders." This result, going far beyond granting minority stockholders an equal voice in management and bearing no resemblance to stockholder representation in director management, would
undoubtedly suppress the use of stockholder management. It is doubtful that majority stockholders will vote for a certificate provision that
completely subordinates their interests to those of the minority. The
different results between voting per capita and voting according to
ownership interests do not exist if the voting stock is divided equally
among the stockholders or if unanimous voting requirements are in
effect. Notwithstanding these special circumstances, permitting stockholders to vote according to their ownership interests in a system of
stockholder management appears to be the preferable construction. A
harsh and unnatural effect 68 upon majority rights would thus be

avoided, with no reduction in the opportunity for minority stockholders to share in management through high voting requirements.
Another problem that is pertinent to the issue of voting rights concerns the use of proxies. Only stockholders are authorized by the gencertificate provision interfering with director management).
65. FLA.STAT. §608.09(1) (1963).
66. FLA.STAT. §608.10(3) (1963).
67. See FLA. STAT. §608.0102 (1963) (stockholder management is not available to corporations with less than three stockholders).
68. But see 13 Am. JuR. Corporations §485, at 526 (1938) (under the common law rule stockholders voted per capita).
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eral Business Corporation Act to give another person the power to vote
their shares through proxies. 9 The question, of course, is whether
stockholders acting as directors can utilize proxies or whether the nonresident stockholder is simply without representation in a system of
stockholder management. A right granted to the board of directors
comparable to the stockholder's right to vote by proxy is found in the
provisions of the general Business Corporation Act that authorize the
board to delegate their powers to an executive committee. 70 Although
this method of taking action is not included in section 608.0102, allowing stockholders to similarly delegate their powers may be desirable
from the standpoint of providing flexibility in management 71 as well as
compatible with stockholder control authorized elsewhere in the new
act.72 Such delegation, however, could deprive 'the minority (or even
the majority if per capita voting rights are applied) of representation
in active management. A provision in the certificate of incorporation
requiring unanimous stockholder approval of any delegation of management powers or prohibiting such delegation altogether would avoid
this danger.73
Control by Stockholder Agreement
The heart of Florida's statutory recognition of the close corporation
is found in 'the provisions that establish the validity of stockholder
agreements relating to all phases of the corporation's affairs.7 4 This
section reflects the true extent of control that is accorded to the stockholders. By their lawful 75 written agreements, the stockholders may
effect a division of power among themselves as they desire and may
make any provision for the exercise of that power in the management
of the corporation. 76 Stockholder agreements establishing the control
69. F.

ST.AT. §608.10(5)

(1963).

70. FLA.STAT. §608.09(2) (1968).
71. See Kessler, The Statutory Requirement for a Board of Directors: A Corporate Anachronism, 27 U. CE. L. Exv. 696, 728 (1960).
72. See FA. STAT. §608.0105(1) (a) (1963).
73. See FLA.STAT. §608.09(2) (1963).

74. "The stockholders of a close corporation may enter into a written agreement, embodied in the articles of incorporation or bylaws of the corporation, or in
a side agreement in writing and signed by all the parties thereto, relating to any
phase of the affairs of the corporation...." FLA. STAT. §608.0105(1) (1963).
75. Stockholder agreements undoubtedly will not be upheld if they are calculated to defraud, oppress, or otherwise injure other stockholders. See, e.g., Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 813, 319, 119 N.E. 559, 561 (1918). Therefore, every
agreement should include a full and detailed explanation of its purpose and the
particular business situation that gives rise to it. O'Neal, Protecting Shareholder
Control Agreements Against Attack, 14 Bus. LAw. 184, 194 (1958).
76. Management by either the directors or by the stockholders themselves is
authorized. FA. STAT. §608.0102 (1963). Stockholder agreements apparently
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structure and operating procedures of the close corporation may take
the form of a provision in the certificate of incorporation," a stockholder bylaw, 78 or a side agreement7 9 signed by all 'the parties
80
thereto.
Prior to the enactment of this law, the status of stockholder side
agreements in Florida was uncertain. Goldfarb Novelty Co. v. Vann8 '
has been cited for the proposition that stockholder agreements are enforceable against all the parties thereto, 2 but this seems a strained interpretation. The decision can be better explained as the mere enforcement of employment and stock subscription contracts between
the plaintiff and the corporation. Although the contracts grew out of
a pre-incorporation agreement, since this agreement was subsequently
adopted by the corporation the court never reached the question of the
validity of stockholder agreements. The decision in Blanchard v.
Commonwealth Oil Co.83 is more relevant. In Blanchard the supreme
court held that an attempted merger was void on the ground that it
contravened an agreement between the stockholders of the merging
corporation. The stockholders had provided in their agreement that
the directorate would be divided equally between the minority and
majority stockholders and that for ten years the stockholders would
vote to reelect the six directors named in the agreement. Unfortunately
the court did not explain how the attempted merger violated the
agreement. Two other courts, however, in deciding collateral suits
between the same parties, have stated that the Florida Supreme Court
are valid under both of these plans.
77. The statute actually uses the term "articles of incorporation," which the
writer suggests is inappropriate. See note 61 supra.
78. The Florida business corporation law authorizes both stockholder and director bylaws. FLA. STAT. §608.07 (1968). A bylaw that qualifies as an agreement entered into by the stockholders would seem to suggest a stockholder bylaw
and not mere acquiescence of the stockholders in a bylaw adopted by directors.
A director bylaw might fall within this section if it were expressly ratified by the
stockholders.
79. The principle of "graduated authority" should apply so that an agreement
embodied in the bylaws will be subordinate to a conflicting agreement in the certificate of incorporation but superior to ,a conflicting side agreement. See 1
O'NEAL, CLO E CoRiRoATMN S §3.79 (1958). The subordinate relationship of the
bylaws to the certificate of incorporation is established in Florida law. FLA. STAT.
§608.07 (1963).
80. Only the side agreement must be signed by all parties thereto if the "generally accepted construction" is to be given to the manner in which §608.0105 is
punctuated. See Florida Racing Comm. v. Bourquardez, 42 So. 2d 87, 88 (Fla.
1949).
81. 94 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1957).
82. Barkin, Deadlock and Dissolution in Florida Closed Corporations, 13 U.
MAMu L. Ituv. 395, 421 (1959).
88. 91 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1956) per curiam.
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enjoined the merger in order to prevent majority stockholders from
denying the minority joint control on the board of directors as promised in the agreement."- If this analysis is accepted, Blanchard furnishes sound authority for the enforceability of stockholder voting
agreements that provide equal control for the minority.
Any doubt as to the validity of stockholder side agreements has
been removed by the passage of the new Close Corporation Act. Not
only does the new act authorize the use of such agreements to establish stockholder control, but it also expressly repudiates the objections
to stockholder agreements most commonly advanced in other jurisdictions. Section 608.0105(2) provides:
No written agreement to which stockholders of a close corporation have actually assented, whether embodied in the charter or
by-aws of the corporation or in any side agreement in writing
and signed by all the parties thereto, and which relates to any
phase of the affairs of the corporation, whether to the management of its business or division of its profits or otherwise, shall
be invalid as between the parties thereto, on the ground that it
is an attempt by the parties thereto to treat the corporation as if
it were a partnership or to arrange their relationships in a manner that would be appropriate only between partners.
The above provision frees the Florida close corporation from the traditional concept that stockholders cannot be "partners inter sese and a
corporation to the rest of the world."8 5 If stockholders desire that
corporate action be taken only upon their unanimous consent, as in a
partnership, they may so provide in the certificate of incorporation,
bylaws or side agreement. If they desire to exercise direct powers of
management, they may assume such powers, regardless of the fact
that the discretion of directors is thereby restricted.8 6 Moreover,
stockholders may surreptiously control the management of the corporation through binding agreements with directors pursuant to section
608.0105(3). No longer can any of these arrangements be invalidated
between the parties thereto as attempts to circumvent the statutory
84. Blanchard v. Commonwealth Oil Co., 294 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1961);
Blanchard v. Commonwealth Oil Co., 116 So. 2d 668 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
85. Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 598, 75 Atl. 568, 571 (Ct. Err. & App.

1910).
86. See Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business
CorporationAct, 34 N.C.L. 11v. 432 (1958), discussing the control that the North
Carolina draftsmen intended to invest in stockholders of close corporations by the
enactment of N.C. Gmr. STAT. §55-73(b) (1960), the model for FLA. STAT.
§618.0105(2) (1963). For decisions cited in Latty, supra, illustrating situations
that the North Carolina act was designed to avoid, see Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-
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scheme of management; 1 by the enactment of the Close Corporation
Act such arrangements have become the statutory scheme in Florida.
The stockholder control made available by section 608.0105 is clouded
only in regard to the one or two-man corporation. Since such corporations are expressly excluded from the provisions authorizing de jure
stockholder management,8 8 utilization of section 608.0105 to achieve
de facto stockholder management is in doubt. As to other close corporations, however, the opportunity for direct and relatively unrestricted control of the corporation according to the stockholders' agreements is clear. This should lead to a decline in the utilization of less
direct control devises preferred before the enactment of the new law.8 9
The provisions of section 608.0105 that remove objections to stockholder agreements90 are almost identical 'to sections of the North
Carolina Business Corporation Act.91 The only significiant difference
is found in the requirement of the latter statute that stockholders
unanimously join in an agreement setting up "relationships ... appropriate only between partners." 92 The omission of this requirement in the Florida act could endanger minority interests if dissenting
stockholders were held bound by a certificate or bylaw provision that
altered the original scheme of control. The Florida act, however, provides that stockholders' agreements that interfere with the discretion
New Brunswick Theatres, 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E.2d 633 (1948), invalidating a
unanimous stockholder agreement depriving the directors of management for 19
years; Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945), invalidating unanimous voting requirements for stockholder resolutions, electing directors, and director action; Kaplan v. Block, 183 Va. 327, 81 S.E.2d 893 (1944),
invalidating charter and bylaw provisions that required unanimous stockholder
approval of all director and stockholder action.
87. Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112, 118, 60 N.E.2d 829, 831
(1945).
88. FL. STAT. §608.0102 (1963).
89. See 1 O'NEAL, CLosE CommoRA-roNs §3.17 (1958) (preference for classified stock); Powers, Cross Fire on the Close Corporation: Norms versus Needs, 11
U. FLA. L. REv. 433, 443 (1958) (preference for cumulative voting plus some
type of control at directors' meetings).
90. FLA. STAT. §609.0105(2), (3) (1963).
91. N.C. GEN.STAT. §§55-73(b), (c)(1960).
92. N.C. Gm. STAT. §55-73(b) (1960). Although the North Carolina provision speaks in terms of an "agreement to which all the shareholders have actually
assented ...
." a noted authority and a chief architect of the North Carolina Act
has stated that the provision does not necessarily invalidate side agreements establishing partner-like arrangements between less than all of the stockholders. Latty,
The Close Corporationand the New North CarolinaBusiness CorporationAct, 84
N.C.L. REv. 432, 439 (1956). New York does not require unanimous consent
for a mere voting agreement, but an agreement that restricts the discretion or powers of directors must be authorized by all the stockholders. N.Y. Bus. Corn,. LAw
§§620(a), (b).
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of directors or establish partner-like control shall not be invalid for
those reasons "as between the parties thereto."93 These provisions
could be judicially construed as allowing dissenting stockholders the
right to challenge such agreements. By adopting this construction the
courts effectively can impress upon the act a requirement for unanimous stockholder approval of extraordinary control agreements.
The act, having validated control agreements, raises several troublesome questions concerning stockholder liability arising out of such
agreements. Section 608.0105(3) provides:
If the business of a close corporation is managed by a board
of directors, an agreement among all or less than all of the stockholders, whether solely among themselves or between one or
more of them and a party who is not a stockholder, is not invalid, as among the parties thereto, on the ground that it so relates to the conduct of 'the affairs of the corporation as to
interfere with the discretion of the board of directors, but the
making of such an agreement shall impose upon the stockholders who are parties thereto the liability for managerial acts that
is imposed by the laws of this state upon directors.
This provision is similar to section 608.0102(2), which imposes liability
upon stockholders operating under a system of stockholder management, but there is one important difference. Section 608.0105(8) expressly confers liability upon stockholders who are parties to the
"agreement." This language creates no problem as to side agreements, since the only "stockholders" involved in the managerial act
that results in liability are parties to the agreement. If, however,
"agreements" is construed to include certificate and bylaw provisions
that confer director powers upon stockholders, 94 the courts may have
to decide which of two groups of stockholders is liable-those that
voted to adopt such certificate or bylaw provisions or those who subsequently voted pursuant to these provisions to take the managerial
action resulting in liability. For example, if less than all of the stockholders voted to adopt a certificate or bylaw provision giving stockholders the power to declare dividends, 95 and pursuant to this
93. FLA. STAT. §608.0105(2), (3) (1963. (Emphasis added.)
94. Compare FLA. STAT. §608.0105(1), (2) (1963) (provisions made expressly applicable to agreements embodied in the certificate and bylaws). If
§608.0105(3) is not construed to include provisions in the certificate or bylaws
there is no statutory authority for imposing liability on stockholders exercising director powers pursuant to such provisions. The stockholder management provisions, FLA. STAT. §608.0102 (1963), are not applicable when the corporation has
a board of directors.
95. Directors have the sole power to declare dividends under the general corporation law. FLA. STAT. §§608.51-.54 (1963).
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authority less than all the stockholders subsequently voted to declare
a dividend that impaired capital, 96 which stockholders should be held
liable? It is contrary to basic corporation principles to impose liability
on a stockholder, who had actively opposed the dividend declaration, 97 merely because he had voted to place the power to declare
dividends in the hands of stockholders. It seems even more absurd to
absolve from all liability a stockholder who had voted for the dividend
declaration, on the basis that he had not voted for, and was therefore
not a party to, the certificate or bylaw provision restricting the directors' power over dividends. To further complicate matters, the act
makes no provision for the liability of directors who are controlled by
stockholder agreements. Perhaps directors should be relieved from
liability resulting from the managerial acts of stockholders, when these
acts are removed from the control of directors. The uncertainty in this
area must be eliminated by judicial decision or statutory amendment"8
before stockholders will be able to decide intelligently whether to exercise the control authorized by the new provisions.
The Florida Legislature by not expressly providing for judicial enforcement of stockholder agreements has neglected perhaps the most
critical question in this area. If the courts will not specifically enforce
stockholder agreements, then such agreements will be relatively useless as control devices. Breach of an agreement that protects a stockholder's interest in a going concern satisfies at least one requirement of
equity jurisdiction in that damages at law seldom afford an adequate
remedy. Primarily for this reason, the rule in many jurisdictions today
is that stockholder agreements are enforceable by specific performance 9 9 or by injunction. 106 Hopefully the Florida courts will follow
96. FLA.

STAT.

§608.53 (1963)

(director liability for dividend that impairs

capital).
97. See F.A.

STAT.

§608.54 (1963); cf., 13 AM. Jun. Corporations §994

(1938).
98. The similar provisions in the Business Corporation Law of New York not
only afford better protection for minority stockholders, creditors, and directors, but
also are less confusing. A provision restricting the discretion of directors must be
contained in the certificate of incorporation, N.Y. Bus. Corn,. LAw §§620(b), 701;
the provision must be approved by all of the stockholders, N.Y. Bus. Con,. LAw
§620(b) (1) (2); and directors are relieved from liability to the extent that their

discretion is controlled, N.Y. Bus. CorP. LAW§620(f).
99. "Such agreement by all of the stockholders to vote for certain persons as
directors and to continue a director as manager is not unlawful on its face and may
be specifically enforced if there is no interference with the rights of creditors or

minority stockholders."

Samuelson v. Starr, 213 N.Y.S.2d 889, 891 (Sup. Ct.

1961).
100. E.g., Weber v. Sidney, 244 N.Y.S.2d 228 (1st Dep't 1963) (stockholderdirector enjoined from acting in corporate affairs in violation of agreement with
the other stockholder to divide profits equally). For a collection of cases specifi-
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this modem trend.' 0 '
A general authorization contained in section 608.0105 extends the
province of stockholder agreements to "any phase of the affairs of the
corporation." The use of these terms would seem to comprehend not
only agreements relating to the active affairs of the corporations but
agreements relating to dissolution as well. In addition to the general
authorization, section 608.0105 enumerates seven nonexclusive phases
of corporate affairs as proper subjects for stockholder agreements.
Management of the Affairs of the Corporation. This is a general
authorization setting the tone for the entire section. 0 2
Declaration and Payment of Dividends and Profits. Under the
general Business Corporation Act, 'the board of directors controls the
declaration of dividends. 03 Under the new Close Corporation Act,
stockholders may require directors to declare dividends when earnings
reach predetermined levels, 10 4 or they may assume for themselves
the power to decide all questions relating to dividends. The new act
should not be construed to free stockholders from the dividend restrictions imposed by the general Business Corporation Act for the protection of creditors. 10 5 Stockholders should be protected where an
agreement between less than all stockholders controls dividend policy,
by holding majority stockholders to a fiduciary duty to deal fairly with
the minority.
Who Shall Be Officers and Directors,or Both, of the Corporation.
Directors are solely empowered by the general Business Corporation
Act to choose the president, secretary, and treasurer of the corporation. 0 0 The officers of a close corporation, however, may be elected
cally enforcing stockholder agreements see 1 O'Nn AL,
at 301-02 n.74; Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 799, 817 (1956).

CLOSE

Cou'oRATnoNs §5.30,

101. See Blanchard v. Commonwealth Oil Co., 91 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1956)
(attempted merger invalidated as contravening stockholder agreement). But cf.,
FLA. STAT. §608.43(1) (1963) (trustee's act contrary to the conditions of a voting
trust will not affect the validity of any actions of the stockholders).
102. To insure complete and direct control of management, stockholders may
eliminate the board of directors entirely. FLA. STAT. §608.0102 (1963).
103. FLA. STAT. §§608.52-.54 (1963).
104. For an example of a statute that permits stockholders to make a demand
upon the directors for additional dividends see N.C. Gar. STAT. §55-50(i)
(1960).
105. FLA. STAT. §608.52 (1968) (payment of dividends from "the net earnings or from the surplus of the assets over the liabilities including capital . . . but
not otherwise."); FLA. STAT. §608.53 (1963) (dividends may not be declared by
insolvent corporation); FLA. STAT. §608.54 (1963) (dividends may not be declared out of capital).
106. FLA.STAT. §608.40 (1963).
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or appointed by the stockholders under a system of stockholder management or pursuant to an agreement placing this particular power in
the hands of stockholders. In addition, stockholders may enter into
voting agreements among themselves, and with directors when director management is retained, 0 7 to insure the election or appointment
of particular persons. To protect this right, the certificate of incorporation should provide that only stockholders can remove the officers
they elect. Otherwise directors have the power to remove officers
08
without cause.'
Minority stockholders in a close corporation can be assured director
representation in several ways not possible before the passage of the
new act. (1) The desired directors can be named in the articles of
incorporation, 0 9 and veto powers can be given to minority stockholders through high vote requirements for director election.110 Unless
new directors are satisfactory to all interests the original directors will
hold over."' (2) Minority stockholders can enter into binding agreements with the majority to vote for certain persons as directors.112
(3) Self-representation at the management level can be achieved by
adopting stockholder management.". 3 Other methods authorized by
the general Business Corporation Act that allow minority stockholders
to elect directors, such as cumulative voting" 4 and classified stock,"15
are still available to stockholders of a close corporation.
107. See FLA.STAT. §608.0105(3) (1963).
108. Frank v. Anthony, 107 So. 2d 136 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
109. The first board of directors (unless stockholder management is adopted)
must be named in the articles of incorporation. FLA. STAT. §608.03(2)(h)
(1963).
110. FLA. STAT.§608.0105(1)(e) (1963).
111. FLA. STAT. §608.51 (1963). Caveat: this method of assuring minority
stockholders' representation on the board of directors will be totally ineffective if
courts grant dissolution based on stockholder deadlock arising out of a director
election. Compare N.C. Gm . STAT. §55-125(2) (1960) authorizing dissolution
when the "shareholders are deadlocked in voting power, otherwise than by virtue
of special provisions or arrangements designed to create veto power among the
stockholders. . .
112. See Blanchard v. Commonwealth Oil Co., 91 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1956).
113. See FLA. STAT. §608.0102 (1963).
114. FLA. STAT. §608.03(2) (j) (1963).
115. FLA.STAT. §608.14(1) (1963). The attractiveness of stock classification
has been eliminated for the close corporation desiring to be taxed as a partnership
under Subchapter S,INrr. Rnv. CoDE OF 1954, §§1371-77. Section 1371(a)(4)
provides that such corporation may possess only one class of stock. A recent Revenue Ruling casts a shadow over the use of stockholder agreements as control devices, holding that if one group of stockholders gives another group an unrevocable
proxy to vote the former's shares (a popular means of executing stockholder agreements) the result is two classes of stock with different voting rights. The Ruling
is even more ominous in its holding that a voting agreement that gives "dispropor-

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol16/iss4/4

20

Feagin: Statutory Recognition
of the Close Corporation in Florida
NOTES
Restrictions on Transfer of Stock. Restrictions on the transfer of
stock may be necessary to insure that the close corporation continues
to meet the definition governing the application of the act. 1 6 Moreover, since stockholders of a typical close corporation must work together closely, it is important that they be able to control the sale of
stock to third parties and thus avoid the possibility of crippling frictions." 7 Commonly used stock transfer restriction plans include: (1)
the "consent-restraint agreement," which requires a stockholder to obtain the permission of other stockholders before he can transfer his
shares;" 8 (2) the "buy-out" provision, which requires a corporation to
buy the shares of a deceased stockholder to prevent an undesired
transfer at death;" 9 (8) the "first-option" agreement, which affords
20
the first option to purchase to the corporation or other stockholders.
In Wiesman v. Lincoln Corp.121 the Florida Supreme Court expressly approved a first-option agreement and in the course of its decision approved reasonable restrictions in general. 1 22 Statutory recognition of transfer restrictions prior to the Close Corporation Act is
implied in that section of the Uniform Stock Transfer Law, adopted by
Florida, which requires that any transfer restriction be noted on the
share certificates. 123 This requirement is applicable to all corporations, whether close or public-issue.
Voting Requirements Including the Requirement of Unanimous
Voting of Stockholders or Directors. This provision removes the close
tionate voting power" to "some shares" will also disqualify. Rev. Rul. 63-226,
1963 INT. RLv. BuLL. No. 43, at 11.
116. By definition the stock of the Florida close corporation must not be "generally traded in the markets maintained by securities dealers or brokers." FLA.
STAT. §608.0100(2) (1968).
117. See News-Journal Corp. v. Gore, 147 Fla. 217, 2 So. 2d 741 (1941)
wherein the minority stockholders sold out to competition who immediately

brought suit against the majority for alleged mismanagement.
118. 2 O'NFAL, CLosE CoitpoRuxoNs, §§7.08-7.10, at 12-16 (1958); Powers,
Cross Fire on the Close Corporation: Norms versus Needs, 11 U. FLA. L. REv.
433,454-56 (1958).
119. iId.
120. Ibid.
121. 76 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1954).
122. The Weisnan court relied upon Fla. Laws, 1925 ch. 10096, §7, which
authorized a corporation to make bylaws for "the transfer of its stock." That section has been superseded by FLA. STAT. §608.13(5) (1963), which authorizes a
corporation to make bylaws "for the transfer on its records of its stock ....
(Emphasis added.) Section 608.0105(1) (d) of the Close Corporation Act has
rendered any effect of this change inapplicable to the close corporation. See also
Note, Stock Transfer Restrictions in Closely Held Corporations,10 U. FLA. L. REv.
54, 56-57 (1957).
123. FLA.

STAT.§614.17

(1963).
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corporation from the restraint of two familiar corporate norms-the
election of directors by a plurality of stockholder votes 124 and board
of director action by a majority vote.125 Minority stockholders may
now validly hold and exercise a veto power over any action at both
the stockholder and director levels through high, including unanimous,
voting requirements. 128 Third parties should be afforded notice of
such veto powers and the possibility of deadlock. The act could furnish the requisite notice by directing that high vote requirements be
contained in the certificate or bylaws and noted on the share certificates.

12 7

There is no indication that stockholders' control over voting requirements does not extend to reducing as well as increasing such requirements. Other states have expressly provided for low vote
requirements in their business corporation laws. 2 8 Although this section probably can be construed 'to sanction high quorum requirements, 129 their value as a control device is insignificant when compared with high voting requirements.
Employment of Stockholders by the Corporation. Stockholders can
be guaranteed continued employment by a close corporation, and thus
continued income, by giving the stockholder-employee veto power,
either as a director or stockholder, over his own removal. The stockholder should also enter into a lifetime employment contract with the
corporation. The objection that such contracts unlawfully restrict the
discretion of directors no longer has any force. 18 0
Arbitration of Issues That Have Resulted in Deadlock. High vote
requirements, 131 conceivably placing veto power over stockholder and
124. FLA. STAT. §608.08(1) (1963).
125. FLA. STAT. §608.09(1) (1963). For high vote requirements authorized
by the general Business Corporation Act see FLA. STAT. §608.18 (1963) (amendment of the certificate of incorporation); FLA. STAT. §608.19 (1963) (sale of all
the corporation's property and assets); FLA. STAT. §608.20 (1963) (consolidation
and merger); FLA. STAT. §608.27 (1963) (voluntary dissolution).
126. For examples of cases that invalidate stockholder agreements establishing
veto powers in minority stockholders see, e.g., Bientendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y.
112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945); McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234
(1934).
127. See N.Y. Bus. Conp. LAw §§616, 709.

128. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§22-1816, -1839 (Supp. 1963); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§§30-145(2), -146(2) (1948); IowA CODE §496A.138 (1962).
129. See FLA. STAT. §§608.09(1), .10(4) (1963) providing respectively that a
majority shall constitute a quorum at directors' and stockholders' meetings "unless
the certificate of incorporation or by-laws otherwise provide."

130. See FLA. STAT. §608.0105(2), (3) (1963).
131. See FLA. STAT. §608.0105(1) (e) (1963).
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director action in the hands of every stockholder, create a substantial
risk of deadlock. Since the Close Corporation Act provides for disso13 2
lution when stockholders fail to extract themselves from a deadlock,

some method of resolving corporate disputes and thus avoiding the
harsh result of dissolution should be established by the corporation.
The method obviously preferred by the Florida Legislature is arbitration, referred to in two sections of this act'3 3 and accorded special recognition in a separate statute. 34 The arbitration statute provides that
agreements to arbitrate future disputes are enforceable and irrevocable
regardless of the justiciable nature of the controversy, and thereby
eliminates a primary means of circumventing arbitration agreements.,
The agreement to arbitrate must be contained in the contract under
which the dispute might arise. 13 Therefore, specific arbitration clauses
should be included in all stockholder side agreements in addition to a
general arbitration provision in the certificate of incorporation.
If stockholders are not willing to submit to and be bound by arbitration, alternative remedies for deadlock can be employed. One such
remedy is the "buy-out agreement" that would compel, or provide an
option to, majority stockholders to purchase the shares of the dissenting
minority at a price to be determined according to an agreed-upon procedure. 137 Another remedy, expressly approved by the business corporation laws of other states, 138 is an agreement among the stockholders
that the corporation should be dissolved upon the occurrence of stated
events, such as irreconcilable deadlock. Authorities disagree, however,
on whether courts would give effect to mandatory dissolution arrangements in the absence of express statutory authority. 3 9 Since Florida's
general Business Corporation Act expressly authorizes voluntary dissolution upon the vote of at least a majority of stockholders, 40 a stockholder agreement to vote for dissolution under stated conditions might
receive favorable judicial treatment.
132. FLA. STAT. §608.0107 (1963).
133. FLA.STAT. §§608.0105(1) (g), .0107(8) (1963).
134. FLA.STAT.ch. 57 (1963).
135. See, e.g., Matter of Burkin, 1 N.Y.2d 570, 136 N.E.2d 862 (1956).
136. See FLA. STAT. §57.11 (1963).
137. See Powers, Cross Fire on the Close Corporation: Norms versus Needs,
11 U. FLA. L. REv. 433, 464 (1958).
138. E.g., N.Y. Bus. Cop. LAw §1002; N.C. GEN. STAT. §55-125(a) (8)
(1960).

139. 2 O'Nna, CLosE CORpORATIONS §906, at 177-78 (1958) assumes that
special dissolution agreements even in the absence of express statutory authority
would be upheld. Contra, Powers, Cross Fire on the Close Corporation: Norms
versus Needs, 11 U. FLA. L. Rnv. 433, 463 (1958).
140. FLA. STAT. §608.27(1) (1963).
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INVOLuNTARy DIssoLUTioN UPON DEADLOCK

When opposing interests in a close corporation are irreconcilably
deadlocked and stockholder-prescribed remedies have failed, dissolution may be the best course of action. The general Business Corporation Act provides for involuntary dissolution upon deadlock, but only if
it results from dissension between equally divided ownership interests.' 41 Such provisions are obviously inadequate when deadlock can
be caused by a minority veto authorized by the new act. To meet the
special needs of the close corporation section 608.0107 provides:
The circuit court, sitting in chancery, may entertain a petition of
any stockholder for involuntary dissolution of any close corporation and, at the hearing, may appoint a receiver or trustee of the
corporation and order it dissolved, pursuant to the procedure
provided in §608.29, when it is made to appear:
(1) That the directors of the corporation are deadlocked in
the management of the corporate affairs and the stockholders
are unable to break the deadlock, or
(2) That the stockholders are deadlocked in voting power;
and
(8) Arbitration or any other remedy provided in any written agreement of the stockholders upon deadlock of the directors
or stockholders has failed.
The effect of 'these provisions obviously will depend upon the exercise of the broad discretionary powers invested in the equity courts.
The legislature imposed no express restrictions on the chancellor's authority to grant dissolution in a suit brought by a single stockholder,
when the conditions of deadlock and failure of internal remedy, if any,
have been met. Other states have restricted the application of similar
involuntary dissolution statutes to situations of deadlock when there is
a threat of irreparable injury, 142 when "the business can no longer be
conducted to the advantage of all the shareholders,"1 43 or when the petition is sought by the holders of a certain percentage of the voting
141. FLA. STAT. §608.28 (1963). It has been suggested that an express provision for dissolution upon specific grounds, such as §608.28, deprives the courts of
their general equity powers to dissolve a corporation. 2 O'NEAL, CLosE CoroRATioNs §928, at 229 n.12 (1958). But see Barkin, Deadlock and Dissolution in
FloridaClosed Corporations: Litigation and Planning,13 U. Mm-n L. REv. 895,
397, 405-06 (1959).
142. E.g., -[D.
ANN.STAT. §25-242 (1960).
143. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §55-125(a)(1)

(1960).

Deadlock among stock-

holders in the election of directors arising out of veto provisions is specifically disapproved as grounds for dissolution. N.C. Gm~. STAT. §55-125(a) (2) (1960).
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stock. 144 Florida courts have required a showing that the corporation's
purpose has completely failed before granting dissolution under the inherent powers of equity. 45 It is unlikely, however, that this test will
be applied in granting dissolution under the new act. If such a test is
applied the legislature will have added nothing to the law by enacting
section 608.0107.
Although the legislature has failed to provide guidelines, some restrictions must be observed by -thecourts in granting dissolution pursuant to section 608.0107. If the courts are too liberal, the threat of dissolution will become a potential weapon of oppression in the hands of
either a majority or minority, 46 depending upon the relative injury that
would be suffered by each faction on the death of the corporation. The
potency of this threat in the hands of the majority is increased by the
fact that management of corporate affairs during the winding-up pe147
riod after dissolution is by majority rule of the last board of directors.
Considering these possibilities, stockholders should take advantage of
the opportunity to avoid dissolution by providing in a written agreement a self-determined plan for resolution of their disputes.
DmEcroR AND STocx oLDE

ACrION WrriouTr MEETINGs

Section 608.0103 provides that the board of directors or executive
committee may take action without a meeting upon the written consent of all the directors or committee members. This section presents
no unique departure from corporate norms, for Florida previously has
approved, by statute 148 and by judicial decision,149 informal director
action in certain situations. Numerous other states have provisions
144. N.Y. Bus. Con,.

LAw

§1104(a) (holders of 50%of the outstanding stock

can petition for dissolution in certain situations). A single stockholder can petition if the hopelessness of the stockholder deadlock is indicated by a failure to
elect directors for two years. N.Y. Bus. ConP. LAw §1104(c).
145. See Hanes v. Watkins, 63 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1953); McAllister Hotel v.
Schatzberg, 40 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1949); Finn Bondholders v. Dukes, 157 Fla. 642,
26 So. 2d 802 (1946). See also FLA. STAT. §608.28 (1963) (irreparable injury
not required for dissolution upon deadlock between equally divided ownership

interests).
146. But see Barkin, supra note 141, at 412. "It would seem that equity will

not regard kindly one who has voted to make a deadlock and now petitions for
dissolution where it is clear that he has not acted in good faith with regard to the
other shareholders."
147. FLA.STAT. §608.30(2) (a) (1963).

148. FLA. STAT. §608.18 (1963) (director approval without a meeting of
amendment to the certificate of incorporation).
149. Hanes v. Watkins, 63 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1953); Redstone v. Redstone
Lumber & Supply Co., 101 Fla. 226, 133 So. 882 (1931); Etheredge v. Barrow,
102 So. 2d 660 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
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similar to section 608.0103.150 From these Florida has apparently chosen the North Carolina statute 51 to serve as its model, although there
is a significant variation between the two statutes. A limitation in the
North Carolina statute requires that action be taken initially on the
concurrence of at least a majority of the directors. This restriction was
omitted from the Florida provision, probably to afford maximum flexibility to the close corporation. Another provision omitted from Florida's act, but included within the North Carolina statute, authorizes
validation of director action taken without a meeting by subsequent
acquiescence or ratification of the shareholders.'1 2 Whether Florida's
act by its omission impliedly invalidates this method of perfecting director action, previously well established by Florida case law,1 3 is open
to question.
Section 608.0104 authorizes stockholders to act without a meeting if
written consent to the action so taken is signed by all the persons entitled to vote thereon.154 This section establishes a stricter standard for
close corporations in regard to certain action taken without a meeting
than that imposed on public issue corporations under the general act.
Approval of the sale of the corporation's assets, 5 one of several acts
expressly authorized by the general Business Corporation Act to be
taken without a meeting,'3 6 requires only the written consent of a majority of stockholders. The stricter standard applicable to close corporations can be justified on the basis of protecting minority interests, an
obvious purpose of the Close Corporation Act.
Section 608.0103 expressly authorizes that written consent to director action without a meeting can be obtained after the action is taken.
In contrast this authorization is omitted from section 608.0104 relating
to stockholder action without a meeting. The argument can be made
that this difference implies a legislative intent that stockholders may
not validly act without a meeting unless the requisite consent is ob150. E.g., Dim. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §141(b) (Supp. 1961); ILL. REv. STAT.
§157.147.1 (1961). But see N.Y. Bus. CoRnP. LAW §708 (expressly provides for
director action only at meetings).
151. N.C. Gm. STAT. §55-29 (1960).
152. N.C.GEN.STAT. §55-29 (2) (1960).
153. Redstone v. Redstone Lumber & Supply Co., 101 Fla. 226, 133 So. 882
(1931).
154. This section is apparently drawn from the Model Act. 2 MODEL Bus.
Conp. AcrANN. §138 (1960).
155. FLA. STAT. §608.19(1) (1963).
156. FLA. STAT. §608.18(8) (1963) (amendment to the certificate of incorporation contained in a written statement signed by all the stockholders); FLA. STAT.
§608.19(1) (1963) (written consent to the sale of all the corporation's assets
signed by at least a majority of the stockholders); FLA. STAT. §608.27(2) (1963)
(written consent to dissolution signed by all the stockholders).
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tained beforehand. This argument is countered, however, by the legislature's use of the past tense (consent to action "so taken") in describing stockholder action without a meeting. 157
REMovAL OF DmEcrons WrrmouT CAusE

Section 608.0106 authorizes stockholders to remove directors with
or without cause notwithstanding a lack of authorization for such action
in the certificate of incorporation or bylaws. The section provides:
The stockholders of a close corporation entitled to elect a director of such corporation may at any time remove such director,
with or without cause, by like action of the stockholders as required for the election of such director, absent a contrary provision by agreement or in the by-laws or Articles of Incorporation
of the corporation.
Although the general Business Corporation Act makes no provision
1 that the
for director removal, it was assumed in Frank v. Anthony 58
certificate of incorporation or bylaws of a Florida corporation could
authorize removal without cause. Absent such authorization, however,
directors could be removed only for cause, having first been given suffcient notice and an adequate hearing.' 59 Under the Close Corporation
Act, procedure governing the removal of directors may be established
by the certificate of incorporation or bylaws, or by agreement.160 In
the absence of contrary provisions in the certificate, bylaws, or "agreements" section 608.0106 applies.
The vote that is necessary to remove a director may give rise to controversy. The language seems capable of at least two interpretations:
(1) stockholders are permitted to remove any director(s) if they have
voting power to elect such director(s); or (2) stockholders are permitted to remove only such directors as the voting power of their shares
in fact elected. An adoption of the former interpretation could lead to
director-removal battles between opposing stockholder factions holding
157. There is no basis for distinguishing between the procedure required for
director action and that required for stockholder election when stockholders have
adopted stockholder management. See FLA. STAT. §608.0102(3) (1963) directing that §608.0104 govern action of stockholders without a meeting under stockholder management. The model for the latter section was drawn without consideration of stockholder management. 2 MoDEL Bus. Conp. Acr ANN. §138 (1960).
158. 107 So. 2d 136 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
159. See Note, 12 U. FA. L. REv. 232,234 (1959).
160. The reference to "agreement" is ambiguous in that there is no requirement that it be written or signed by all the stockholders. Certainly a verbal agreement among less than all the stockholders would be valid only among the parties
thereto and could not foreclose non-assenting stockholders from taking advantage
of these provisions.
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cumulative voting rights, thus keeping the board of directors in a constant state of flux. If the latter interpretation were applied, a stockholder's power of removal would not extend to directors elected by
others, thus, eliminating this danger. Under the latter interpretation,
however, the courts may encounter a problem where a transferee of
shares attempts to remove a director elected prior to the transfer. If
the transferee obtained his shares from several sources and if the combined voting power of the shares is sufficient to elect a single director,
the question could arise whether the transferee had power to remove,
and if so to which director did his power to remove apply? Despite
the remote possibility of such a problem, the latter interpretation seems
preferable. This interpretation could have been assured by including
in section 608.0106 a clause providing that only stockholders who own
those shares actually voted for a director may remove such director
without cause.
In other jurisdictions stockholders holding cumulative voting rights
sufficient to elect one director at an election of the entire board can
prevent the removal of any director with or without cause.10 1 Although such a provision allows stockholders to retain their representation on the board, stockholders might be powerless to remove a director who betrayed the interests he was elected to represent. The
uncertainty in Florida's provisions can be avoided if the stockholders
are issued different classes of stock, each class having the right to elect
a director. In this situation the power to elect could apply only to one
director. Classified stock, however, has tax disadvantages that may
prevent its use by a close corporation. 162 The simplest solution to the
problem is a provision in the certificate of incorporation spelling out
removal procedures which satisfy the stockholders. To insure that the
purpose of such provision is not circumvented, the certificate should
also include authorization for the stockholders to fill vacancies created
by removal, a power otherwise vested in the directors. 163
MrscELLANEous PRovis ONs AN Emcrs

Section 608.0101 of the new act purports to establish the validity of
the one or two-man corporations, thereby raising an issue previously
considered to be well settled in Florida. In Advertects Inc. v. Sawyer
Industries,164 the Florida Supreme Court clearly held that the fact that
one or two individuals owned the entire stock of a corporation would
not in itself establish the corporate entity as a fraud or destroy the lim161. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. Cosp. LA W §706(c) (1).
162. See note 115 supra.

163. FLA. STAT. §608.08(2) (1963).
164. 84 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1955).
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ited liability of the stockholders. It is at least arguable that such corporations formed prior to the effective date of this act must elect to bring
themselves within the act's provisions in order to insure their continued
existence with full powers. Moreover, even when it is within the act
the one or two-man corporation will not receive all of the "capacities,
powers, or authority which it would have possessed with three or more
stockholders . . . ." as section 608.0101 guarantees. This inconsistency
has been created by section 608.0102, which denies to such a corporation the right to have its business managed by the stockholders rather
than by a board of directors, a right available to all other close corporations.
Probably the most confusing section of the Close Corporation Act is
section 608.0100(3) which provides: "Whenever applicable, the provisions of this act shall apply notwithstanding any provisions of this act
to the contrary Meaning can be ascribed to this provision only if it is
assumed that the legislature intended that the second "act" in the above
provision should read "Tart I, Chapter 608." Otherwise the section
stands as a remarkable example of legislative double talk.
CONCLUSION
There is little doubt that Florida's Close Corporation Act represents
a substantial advance in legislative recognition of the close corporation. No other state has indicated a greater willingness to deal with
the problems of the close corporation according to the needs of the
business community and to free it from subjection to corporate norms
that have no relation to those needs. The full benefits of the legislature's efforts are now denied to Florida's close corporations, however,
due to the uncertainties and inconsistencies prevalent in the language
of the act. It is hoped that the legislature will turn its attention to the
task of enacting the necessary amendments with the same spirit that
produced this commendable first effort.
ROBERT

FLA.STAT. ch.

608, pt. II

R. FEAGwn

APPENDIX
(1963): CLOSE Com'oRATioNs

Section 608.0100 Scope; definitions.
(1) The provisions of this act shall extend to all close corporations, but shall
be deemed permissive and not mandatory; provided, however, that this act shall
have no application to any close corporation in existence on September 1, 1963,

unless such previously existing close corporation shall elect to bring itself within
the provisions of this act by written consent of the owners of a majority of the

voting stock.
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(2) As used herein, close corporation means a corporation for profit whose
shares of stock are not generally traded in the markets maintained by securities
dealers or brokers.
(3) Whenever applicable, the provisions of this act shall apply notwithstanding any provision of this act to the contrary.
(4) Wherever used herein, unless otherwise stated, stockholders shall mean
stockholder if there be only one stockholder of a corporation.
Section 608.0101 Acquisition of all the shares of stock by limited number of
persons.
(1) The existence of a corporation, hereafter or heretofore formed under the
laws of this state, shall in no respect be deemed impaired by the acquisition of all
the shares of stock of such corporation by one person or by two persons, nor shall
the corporation, by such acquisition, be deemed not to possess any managerial
boards or bodies or any capacities, powers or authority which it would have
possessed with three or more stockholders, nor shall the corporation, upon such
acquisition, be deemed to have become dormant, inactive or incapable of acting
as a corporation.
(2) The acquisition, heretofore or hereafter, of all of the shares of stock of a
corporation by one person or by two persons is hereby declared to violate no
policy or provision of the laws of this state.
Section 608.0102 Corporation management by stockholders.
The articles of incorporation of a close corporation may provide that the
business of the corporation shall be managed by the stockholders of the corporation rather than by a board of directors, provided that there be not less than
three stockholders; and, if the articles of incorporation provide as aforesaid, the
following provisions shall apply:
(1) Wherever the context requires, the stockholders of such close corporation
shall be deemed directors of such corporation for purposes of applying the provisions of part I chapter 608.
(2) The stockholders of such close corporation shall be subject to the liabilities
imposed by part I, chapter 608 for action taken by directors.
(3) Any action required or permitted by part I, chapter 608 to be taken by
the directors of a corporation may be taken by action of the stockholders of such
close corporation at a meeting of the stockholders or as provided in §608.0104.
Section 608.0103 Conduct of business without meeting by board of directors
or executive committee.
If the business of a close corporation is managed by a board of directors,
action taken by the directors or the members of an executive committee of the
directors without a meeting shall nevertheless be board or committee action if
written consent to the action in question is signed by all the directors or members
of the committee, as the case may be, and filed with the minutes of the proceedings of the board or committee, whether done before or after the action so taken.
Section 608.0104 Conduct of business without meeting by stockholders.
Any action of the stockholders of a close corporation may be taken without a
meeting if consent in writing, setting forth the action so taken, shall be signed by
all the persons who would be entitled to vote upon such action at a meeting and
filed with the secretary of the corporation as part of the corporate records. Such
consent shall have the same force and effect as a unanimous vote of the stockholders, and may be stated as such in any certificate or document filed with the
secretary of state under this chapter.
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Section 608.0105 Written agreements as to conduct of certain affairs of corporation.
(1) The stockholders of a close corporation may enter into a written agreement embodied in the articles of incorporation or bylaws of the corporation, or in
a side agreement in writing and signed by all the parties thereto, relating to any
phase of the affairs of the corporation, including, but not limited to, the following:
(a) Management of the business of the corporation.
(b) Declaration and payment of dividends or division of profits.
(c) Who shall be officers or directors, or both, of the corporation.
(d) Restrictions on transfer of stock.
(e) Voting requirements, including the requirements of unanimous voting of
stockholders or directors.
(f) Employment of stockholders by the corporation.
(g) Arbitration of issues as to which the stockholders are deadlocked in voting
powers or as to which the directors are deadlocked and the stockholders are unable to break the deadlock.
(2) No written agreement to which stockholders of a close corporation have
actually assented, whether embodied in the charter or bylaws of the corporation or
in any side agreement in writing and signed by all the parties thereto, and which
relates to any phase of the affairs of the corporation, whether to the management
of its business or division of its profits or otherwise, shall be invalid as between the
parties thereto, on the ground that it is an attempt by the parties thereto to treat
the corporation as if it were a partnership or to arrange their relationships in a
manner that would be appropriate only between partners.
(8) If the business of a close corporation is managed by a board of directors,
an agreement among all or less than all of the stockholders, whether solely among
themselves or between one or more of them and a party who is not a stockholder,
is not invalid, as among the parties thereto, on the ground that it so relates to the
conduct of the affairs of the corporation as to interfere with the discretion of the
board of directors, but the making of such an agreement shall impose upon the
stockholders who are parties thereto the liability for managerial acts that is i:posed by the laws of this state upon directors.
Section 608.0106 Director.
The stockholders of a close corporation entitled to elect a director of such corporation may at any time remove such director, with or without cause, by like
action of the stockholders as required for the election of such director, absent a
contrary provision by agreement or in the bylaws or articles of incorporation of the
corporation.
Section 608.0107 Dissolution; appointment of receiver or trustee.
The circuit court, sitting in chancery, may entertain a petition of any stockholder for involuntary dissolution of any close corporation and, at the hearing,
may appoint a receiver or trustee of the corporation and order it dissolved, pursuant to the procedure provided in §608.29, when it is made to appear:
(1) That the directors of the corporation are deadlocked in the management
of the corporate affairs and the stockholders are unable to break the deadlock, or
(2) That the stockholders are deadlocked in voting power; and
(3) Arbitration or any other remedy provided in any written agreement of the
stockholders upon deadlock of the directors or stockholders has failed.
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